TY - CHAP
T1 - Disinterpellation and Naturalism
AU - Delimata, Natalie
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Disinterpellation emerges at the moment of diagnostic disclosure when a patient’s dualistic understanding of sex is intersected by the scientific fact that sex is variant and this variance is inscribed onto his/her body disturbing the subjective coherence of the patient’s identity. This discordance is described as a tear in the fabric of knowledge where two forces, social ideals and scientific fact pull in opposite directions. To mend this tear this book critically examines three different mechanisms: essentialism, naturalism and emergentism. This chapter explores the second of these, naturalism, which involves collapsing David Hume’s is/ought or fact/value distinction by objectively applying social ought to scientific fact. Naturalism attempts to escape the normative connotations of this by situating biological ought in natural selection, which is argued provides objective grounds for natural ought. Two influential theorists have employed this approach: Ruth Millikan through her concept of ‘proper functions’ and Christopher Boorse through his account of ‘disease’. Following a critical examination of these two perspectives the chapter concludes that it is not possible to identify objective ought and that all ought is subjective.
AB - Disinterpellation emerges at the moment of diagnostic disclosure when a patient’s dualistic understanding of sex is intersected by the scientific fact that sex is variant and this variance is inscribed onto his/her body disturbing the subjective coherence of the patient’s identity. This discordance is described as a tear in the fabric of knowledge where two forces, social ideals and scientific fact pull in opposite directions. To mend this tear this book critically examines three different mechanisms: essentialism, naturalism and emergentism. This chapter explores the second of these, naturalism, which involves collapsing David Hume’s is/ought or fact/value distinction by objectively applying social ought to scientific fact. Naturalism attempts to escape the normative connotations of this by situating biological ought in natural selection, which is argued provides objective grounds for natural ought. Two influential theorists have employed this approach: Ruth Millikan through her concept of ‘proper functions’ and Christopher Boorse through his account of ‘disease’. Following a critical examination of these two perspectives the chapter concludes that it is not possible to identify objective ought and that all ought is subjective.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85094947822&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-21898-0_7
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-21898-0_7
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85094947822
T3 - Philosophy and Medicine
SP - 115
EP - 140
BT - Philosophy and Medicine
PB - Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
ER -